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R&D and innovation have become much more strate-
gic than ever before for the growth of China as well as 
for its global societal upgrade. The Chinese authorities 
have designed an innovation strategy to face new eco-
nomic and social challenges. The first part of the paper 
is focused on the emergence of the policy, in the 2006-
2020 Plan for S&T, with a historical perspective explai-
ning the legacy of the past in today’s choices. In the 
second part, we illustrate China’s catching up strategy 
through four sectors (high-speed trains, aeronautics, 
clean energy, IT) and discuss its potential impact on 
the world industry.
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Abstract
R&D and innovation have become much more strategic than ever before for the growth of China as well 
as for its global societal upgrade. The Chinese authorities have designed an innovation strategy to face 
new economic and social challenges. The first part of the paper is focused on the emergence of the policy, 
in the 2006-2020 Plan for S&T, with a historical perspective explaining the legacy of the past in today’s 
choices. In the second part, we illustrate China’s catching up strategy through four sectors (high-speed 
trains, aeronautics, clean energy, IT) and discuss its potential impact on the world industry.
Keywords
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Résumé
La R&D et l’innovation sont plus stratégiques que jamais pour la croissance de la Chine aussi bien que 
pour le progrès global de sa société. Les autorités chinoises ont mis en place une stratégie d’innovation 
pour affronter de nouveaux défis économiques et sociaux. La première partie de ce papier se concentre 
sur l’émergence de cette politique, dans le Plan de 2006-2020 pour les Sciences et Techniques, avec une 
perspective historique qui explique l’héritage du passé dans les choix contemporains. Dans la seconde 
partie, nous illustrons la stratégie de rattrapage de la Chine dans quatre secteurs (les trains à grande 
vitesse, l’aéronautique, l’énergie propre et technologies de l’information) et discutons de ses impacts 
potentiels sur l’industrie dans le monde.
Mots-clefs
recherche et développement, innovation, stragégie, train à grande vitesse, aéronautique, énergie propre, 
technologies de l’information
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IntroductionIn 2010, China became the world’s largest manufacturing nation (19.8 % of the world manufacturing output) bypassing the US (19.4 %), thus ending its 110 year-run as 
the largest producer of goods1. After joining the 
WTO in 2001, China’s growth during its gol-
den period (2002-2007) was driven mainly by 
fixed asset investment and exports, whose ave-
rage annual growth rates were respectively 29 
and 24 percent. Following the spread of the US 
financial crisis around the world, the fall of glo-
bal demand revealed China’s high export depen-
dency. Meanwhile, the government’s stimulus 
package, based on expansionary fiscal and mone-
tary policy to maintain economic growth, raised 
the investment rate from 25 % to 46 % of GDP 
from 2001 to 2010, leading to an overcapacity 
in certain sectors, a decline in efficiency2, infla-
tion and wage pressure, which reflect the general 
imbalance between investment and consumption.
China’s investment and export led growth is lar-
gely dependent on the supply of cheap labor from 
the hinterland, in a context of stunted urbani-
zation resulting from the Maoist policies (1949 
to 1979). This compelling illustration of Arthur 
Lewis’ development model, whereby the transfer 
of an unlimited supply of labor in the traditional 
sectors feeds accumulation in the modern sectors 
through urbanization dynamics3 has been chal-
lenged for several reasons. First of all, in 2004 
and 2007 there was a shortage of labor, partly 
due to the absence of any social insurance for the 
massive migrant population, in the Pearl River 
Delta Region of Guangdong province, which 
concentrates some 30 % of foreign investments 
and exports, and 10 % of GDP between Canton, 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai, the two special economic 
zones at the borders of Hong Kong and Macao. 
Although this shortage of labor often takes the 
form of high turnover rates, and an imbalance 
of female employment, generally more docile 
and required for precision processing than male 
employment (the ratio between young women 
and men is in the order of 117 to 100), this trend 
will increase in the future. United Nations projec-
tions show that in the 15 years from 2010 to 2025, 
the pool of 15 to 24 year old, which provides the 
1. Study of IHS Global Insight, cited in Financial Times, 
13/03/2011. 
2. Yu Yongding, (2009).
3. Lewis, Arthur, (1954)
bulk of labor-intensive activities, will fall, as a 
result of the one-child policy, by almost 62 mil-
lion people to a total of 164 million4.
Second, China has seen double-digit annual 
growth of real salaries, partly due to the multi-
plication of work conflicts before and after the 
slowdown of 2008-2009. According to a Chinese 
survey in different provinces, 80 % of migrants 
in 2007 were paid less than 800 Yuan (105 $US) 
per month, and two thirds of them were working 
300 hours per month. As shown in (Xu Xianjin, 
2007; Artus, Mistral, Pagnol, 2011 p.62) in 2011, 
the minimum wage for Guangdong satellite 
cities increased to 1100 Yuan (162 $US) after the 
strikes of 2010, and was raised again in Shenzhen 
to 1320 Yuan (200 $US)5. Moreover, nearly half 
of the 200 million migrant workers, born after 
1980, are better-educated, with an average edu-
cation of about ten years, they use the Internet 
and new technologies, and are more demanding 
than their parents. World Bank analysts believe 
that China could become a high-income country 
by 20306.
Third, since 2000, the cost of land has increased 
drastically, and even more so after the 2008 cri-
sis, when land was used to finance the local part 
of the stimulus package, which led to a predic-
table property bubble, in the absence of any land 
tax. Last, but not least, the cost of energy, which 
accounts for a third of the cost of grain produc-
tion, has also risen dramatically, to the point that 
China’s crude oil imports, in 2011, may exceed 
what it earns selling goods to the United States. 
If we add the competitiveness loss due to the 
reevaluation of the Renminbi to the US dollar, 
combined with inflation pressures, it is clear that 
China’s high investment and export-led growth 
model is no longer sustainable. Products, which 
are not classified as high-tech, still account for 68 
% of China’s exports in 2010 (1.09 trillion $US) 
a small change from the 71 % share in 2005. 
China’s light manufacturing share of the US and 
European Union imports started to decline in the 
first half of 2011 from 50 % to 48 %, in favor for 
instance of Bangladesh (up 19 % in exports to the 
US) or Vietnam (up 16 %)7.
4. Bloomberg News, 30/08/2011.
5. Jacob, R. Financial Times, 6/09/2011.
6. China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative 
High-Income Society, World Bank Report, Feb 2012. 
7. Bloomberg, 30/08/2011; Rahul Jacob, Financial Times, 
6/09/2011.
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This quadruple shock, in terms of costs, exchange 
rate, labor, energy and land, increased the role of 
China’s R&D and innovation policy as the main 
strategy for climbing the value chain, as Japan 
and the four dragons had previously done in the 
mid 1980s. The US Department of Commerce 
estimates that 75 % of the growth in the Ameri-
can economy since World War II is due to tech-
nological innovation (Glassman, 2010). 
To restore its competition and national strength, to 
reach the goal of China’s renaissance, the country 
should not only improve its « hard power », which 
refers to the nation’s economic, scientific, tech-
nological and military power, but also its «  soft 
power », viewed as a national sense of unity, the 
population’s education level and the nation’s role 
in and impact on international affairs. In 2005, 
indigenous innovation was also conceived as an 
answer to the strategic place taken by China in 
the internationalization of R&D led by transna-
tional corporations, as underlined by the 2005 
UNCTAD World Investment Report focusing 
on this issue8.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first 
part, we introduce the innovation policy and 
its new strategic orientation as presented in the 
2020 Plan for S&T, established after the fourth 
conference on S&T organized since 1949. We 
give a historical perspective on the development 
of S&T in China, which helps understand the 
current setting. The following section is devoted 
to four areas, where China has been successful in 
recent years, high-speed trains, aeronautics, clean 
energy, and IT, which illustrate the implementa-
tion of the new Chinese policy, and its impact in 
the world. 
« The real leap forward » 
Or the transition from low-
cost labor to technology-
intensive growth
Although science and technology were a key part 
of the « four modernizations » program launched 
by Deng Xiaoping when he rose to power in 
1978-79, the « real leap forward » in S&T really 
began after 2000. It contrasts drastically with the 
catastrophic Great Leap forward of 1958-1959, 
which was based on the negation of science and 
8. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005, available on-
line, hereafter WIR 2005.
technology, and more generally of simple practi-
cal evidence. Nowadays, China’s leaders are extre-
mely accurate on technology issues, as eight of the 
nine members of the Communist Party Political 
Bureau have engineering degrees. They perceive 
innovation and competition as the two sides of 
the same coin, and consider technological inno-
vation as a strong mean to fuel long-term growth.
Following intense debates at the central level, the 
release of a « National Medium and Long–term 
Plan for Science and Technology Development 
(2006-2020) » in early 2006, (hereafter the 2020 
Plan), aims to derive by the end of the decade 
60 % or more of China’s economic growth from 
technological progress, and to catch up with 
more advanced countries. “Innovation with 
Chinese characteristics” or “indigenous innova-
tion” became the motto of the “second stage of 
the opening and reform policy” led by the tandem 
Hu Jintao -- Wen Jiabao (Mc Gregor, 2011). A 
glimpse at the historical development of science 
in China helps understand the current debates, 
fueled by national pride and distrust of foreigners. 
A historical perspective
The efforts of China to catch up in science and 
technology, which have increased continuously 
since the early days of the Deng era, started seve-
ral centuries ago. Modern science, developed in 
Europe, started penetrating China in the second 
half of the 16th century, towards the end of the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644), under the influence 
of the Jesuits who contributed to introduce 
mathematics, astronomy, and geography among 
other fields, and enjoyed great respect in particu-
lar for their deep understanding of issues related 
to calendar making. 
When western science was introduced in China, 
Chinese science and technology lagged far 
behind. Nothing similar to the scientific revo-
lution that took place in Europe had happened 
in China. However, there was a scientific activity, 
with some remarkable breakthroughs such as a 
smallpox vaccine developed in the 16th century, 
long before this type of inoculation was discove-
red in Europe, or a precise measure of the earth 
meridian in the early 18th century. 
The technological supremacy of the West allowed 
it to impose its colonial will on the last Manchu 
(Qing), dynasty (1644-1911) in the 19th century. 
During the first Opium War of 1840, the British 
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Navy tested its newest technology by sending 
the Nemesis, the first ocean-going iron-warship, 
launched in 1839 for the East India Company. 
Mastering military technologies became crucial 
for China, which tried, just like Japan, to adapt 
to modernity by launching a new movement 
of “occidental affairs” (yangwu yundong) where 
Chinese culture was seen as the base and occi-
dental science and technology including military 
technology, were regarded as purely instrumental. 
The awareness of this period is particularly strong 
in contemporary China. 
In the first half of the 20th century, China unde-
rwent a strong influence of foreign culture, car-
ried by the numerous students coming back from 
Japan, the US or Europe, in all fields, including 
humanities. Scientific universities were foun-
ded, such as Tsinghua in 1911, with the aim of 
training students that would continue their cur-
riculum in the US. Traditional Chinese culture, 
mostly Confucianism, was seen as an obstacle to 
modernity during the nationalist May 4th move-
ment (1919), which promoted democracy and 
science and opened the way to a cultural renais-
sance in literature, arts and urban life styles. In 
1928, the new nationalist government created 
the Academia Sinica, the first national institution 
devoted to scientific research.
After the establishment of the People’s Republic 
in 1949, scientific research is reorganized with 
the help of the Soviet Union, with a strongly cen-
tralized model around the Academy of sciences, 
the universities, the technical institutions depen-
ding from the various ministries -- particularly 
the ministry of defense, which concentrates most 
of the effort -- and their provincial affiliates. The 
USSR sent more than 10,000 scientists and tech-
nicians to assist China in its technological deve-
lopment, while around 40,000 Chinese students 
were trained in the Soviet Union. The decisive 
support from the USSR played a key role during 
that period, especially in defense related domains, 
with the space conquest and the atomic bomb. 
After 1949, the scientific policy of China was 
designed during national conferences on S&T 
that took place in 1956, 1978, 1995, and 2005. 
Numerous scientific institutions were founded in 
1956 after the first national conference on S&T, 
during which the decision was taken to create 
a commission for S&T that later became the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, MOST. 
After the Sino-Soviet dispute at the turn of the 
60’s, the achievements of the People’s Republic 
are mostly military, with the explosion of the 
first A-bomb in 1964, the H-bomb in 1967, and 
the first launching of a satellite, Red Orient, by 
a Long March rocket in 1970. One of the most 
important scientific achievements made by China 
might have been the synthesis of insulin, a real 
breakthrough, made during the early 1960’s by 
a scientist trained in the UK, and which could 
have been awarded an international prize such 
as the Nobel, if the Cultural Revolution had not 
put an end to the work of all civilian scientific 
institutions. 
Despite these military achievements, the high 
peak of the Maoist period (1957-1976), from the 
anti-rightist campaign (1957) to the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966-1976) is mainly characterized by the 
negation of science and technology, and the apo-
logy of political will (the famous slogan “Rather 
red than expert”) directly responsible for the 
persecution of hundreds of thousands of intel-
lectuals, for a gigantic waste of resources, for the 
most terrible famine of the century (1959-1961), 
and for technological underdevelopment. 
Catching up becomes one of the top priorities of 
Deng Xiaoping when he returns to power after 
the death of Mao, and launches the reform and 
opening policy. The second national conference 
on S&T is organized in 1978, with the slogan: 
“science and technology: first production force”. 
Universities are reopened as well as research cen-
ters, and intellectuals reintegrated in the work-
force. One of the visionary decisions of Deng is 
to send immediately thousands, tens of thousands 
and finally hundreds of thousands of students 
abroad. Such a policy had an extremely high cost, 
dried up China from its best students, with no 
immediate return, but constituted an incredible 
long-term investment. Agreements of scientific 
and technological cooperation are signed with 
most developed countries in 1978, soon followed 
by agreements between foreign and Chinese 
scientific institutions, while Chinese scientists 
join most international science organizations. 
Several important programs, still at the core of the 
Chinese innovation system today, were created in 
the mid 80s, such as the State Key Lab program, 
launched in 1984, for laboratories on key topics 
directly supported by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), the 863 program, in 1986, 
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for high-tech research, mainly oriented towards 
export, the Torch program, in 1988, for the esta-
blishment of technological parks, etc. Unlike the 
previous institutions based on Soviet planning, 
these programs have been inspired by various 
research systems worldwide. China has deve-
loped an impressive capacity to learn from abroad 
to settle its new organizations. One of the best 
examples of this dynamic is the decision to create 
in 1986 the Natural Science Foundation of China 
(NSFC), independent from the very political 
Ministry of Science and Technology, on the basis 
of the American National Science Foundation. 
The third national conference on S&T took place 
in 1995, with the objective of refocusing research 
institutions towards their original missions and 
improve their quality. The bold reform of the 
Academy of Sciences that followed, contribu-
ted to the modernization of the most prominent 
scientific structures, with a 12-year program 
(1998-2010), organized around three phases: a 
first phase where about a third of the institutes 
were closed down (84 institutes versus 119 before 
the reform), a second phase where the remaining 
institutes were consolidated, and a third phase, 
with the creation of new institutes, many of them 
in the fields of life sciences. The Pasteur Institute 
of Shanghai is one of them. One of the keys of 
this reform has been the systematic organization 
of the reverse brain drain, with very interesting 
programs to support what the Chinese call the 
“turtles”, the returnees, mostly from the US, as 
well as the scientists, who while they stay abroad, 
occupy visiting positions. The returnees are now 
numerous in all the labs, public and private, either 
Chinese or belongings to transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs), where they often have important 
positions, heading most of the research labs of 
TNCs, Microsoft, Nokia, etc. 
The turn of the millenium
The best proof of China’s radical evolution in the 
last decade is the dramatic increase in higher edu-
cation and human resources mostly in enginee-
ring. The percentage of young age cohorts enrolled 
in university curricula, between 2000 and 2008, 
rose from 11 % to 35 %, and the number of gra-
duates increased from 1.7 million to more than 7 
million. About 39 % of students concentrate on a 
scientific curriculum in comparison to 5 % in the 
U.S. There were 700,000 Chinese graduates in 
engineering degrees in comparison to 80,000 in 
the U.S. The share of the active population with a 
university-level education9 is now comparable to 
the Euro zone (26 %), but the absolute number 
is striking (now more than 100 million), as well 
as the number of currently enrolled Chinese stu-
dents (25 million out of 140 million worldwide) 
(Arthus, 2011, p.17, 292).
Between 2000 and 2010, China’s R&D expen-
diture doubled as a share of GDP (0,8 % to 1.75 
%) and R&D personnel increased from about one 
million (full-time equivalent) to 2.8 million10. At 
the end of the decade, its share of total global 
R&D spending equaled Japan’s in purchasing 
power parity (12.3 %) just behind the US (34.4 
%) and Europe (23.3 %). China’s world share 
of researchers was equal to the US (20 %, with 
1.4 million) in 2007, just behind Europe (30 %, 
with 2.1 million) but the rapid increase of R&D 
personnel during the crisis allowed it to catch 
up with Europe11. Nobel Prize winning econo-
mist Robert Fogel of the University of Chicago 
estimates that in the US, a high school educated 
worker is 1.8 times as productive and a college 
graduate, 3 times as productive as someone with 
a ninth grade education. On this basis, he belie-
ves that the increase in high skilled workers will 
substantially boost China’s annual growth rate for 
a generation12. 
The quality of China’s education has also impro-
ved, with the creation of the C9 League, a club 
like the US Ivy League, which includes the top 
universities, and with the adoption of a bold 
policy of internationalization of studies. In 2010, 
the total number of Chinese students and scho-
lars attending foreign universities or research ins-
titutes rose to 284,700, thirteen times more than 
in 1999. Chinese students comprise the highest 
share of foreign students in the US, the European 
Union as well as Japan. At the end of 2010, accor-
ding to the Ministry of Education, China had the 
largest oversea student population in the world, 
with 1.27 million Chinese studying or having 
9. Alain Berder, «La Chine : laboratoire du monde ?», Trésor-
Eco, 60, juin 2009.
10.  Wu, Yanrui (2011), and (2010).
11. Martin Grueber, « 2011 Global R&D Forecast », R&D 
Magazine December 2010, p. 3, available at www.rdmag.
com; Wu, Yanrui (2011): in 2010, they were 2.8 million 
R&D personnel, but we can deduce from previous data that 
70 % (or 1.9 million) are effective researchers.
12. « 2011 Global R&D Funding Forecast », R&D Maga-
zine, December 2010, p.28, www.rdmag.com
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studied abroad, among whom many do not 
return. According to the latest census data, more 
than 700,000 highly skilled residents in OECD 
countries were Chinese-born, 57% of whom were 
living in the United States13.
Nothing is more symptomatic of the qualitative 
change of the last decade than the recent activism 
of China towards intellectual property. Accor-
ding to the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation, the applications for international patents 
by China have tripled between 2006 and 2010, 
representing 7.5% of the world total. They concern 
mainly electrical engineering, telecommunication 
and informatics (58 %), chemicals, biotechno-
logy and drugs (21 %)14. In Europe, China seems 
hyper specialized in telecommunications, as its 
share of patents submission was 4.3 % in 2008. 
In the US patent system, China is specialized 
in spatial armaments, with a progression of 672 
% of patents delivered between 2003 and 2008. 
A recent WIPO report shows that China and 
the US accounted for most (4/5) of the growth 
in patent filings in 201015. As for the scientific 
publication production, between 2003 and 2008, 
China bypassed Japan, still lagging behind the 
European Union and the US, rather strong in 
mathematics, engineering sciences, physics, che-
mistry, but much weaker in life sciences16.
Transnational Corporations are key players since 
they account for about half of global R&D and 
at least two thirds of business R&D expenditures 
(estimated at 450 billion $US in 2005). R&D 
spending of some large TNC’s is higher than that 
of many countries, as six of them, concentrated in 
a few industries (IT hardware, automotive, phar-
maceutical and biotechnology) spent more than 
5 billion $US on R&D in 2003 (Ford, Pfizer, 
Daimler Chrysler, Siemens, Toyota, GM). The 
share of R&D of their majority owned foreign 
13. R&D Magazine, December 2010, p.27; According to 
different figures, Chinese students represented 13.6 % of 
foreign students in the European Union in 2005, their main 
destination, with an enrolment of 109,000, versus 92,000 
in the US (Trésor-Eco, n°60, p.3); Chen Jia, China Daily, 
18/04/2011; Martin Schaaper, (2009), p.4. 
14. Carta IEDI n°482, 26/08/2011, A transformaça da 
China em economia orientada à inovaçao, Parte 1, p.21, 
available online. (Excellent bibliography)
15.  WIPO, World Intellectual Property Indicators, 2011 
edition.
16. 中国科技论文统计结果 2009; Observatoire des 
Sciences et Techniques, Rapport Bi-annuel 2010, p. 361, 
p.345-348.
affiliates, varied from 13% for the US to 43 % in 
the case of Sweden, in the first years of the new 
century. During the period 2002-2004, deve-
loping Asia and Oceania took over half of the FDI 
projects involving R&D worldwide, and China, 
which had already around 700 foreign R&D units 
in 2005, was mentioned by the largest number of 
TNC’s as the main destination for R&D future 
expansion, before the US and India17.
The internationalization of R&D in China was 
driven by the need to adapt products and pro-
cesses to key host-markets (adaptive R&D), to 
monitor the activities of competitors, but also in 
a first phase, by the quest for R&D cost reduc-
tion as well as to access expanding pools of tal-
ents. Internationalization might create potential 
tensions between the TNC’s and the host coun-
try’s governments « in that the former may seek 
to retain proprietary knowledge while the latter 
seeks to secure as many spillovers as possible  ». 
The key determinant is therefore the absorptive 
capacity of the host country, the type of R&D 
conducted, and its links to production. « The more 
a TNC interacts with a host developing country’s 
local firms and R&D institutions, and the more 
advanced the country’s national innovation sys-
tem, the greater the likelihood of positive effects 
on a host economy »18. In other words, there are 
no more closed frontiers or strict labor divisions 
between the «  innovators » and the « commod-
ity providers ». The commodity providers at low 
prices may also become innovators at low prices, 
for competitive products targeting the emerging 
markets for instance.
TNC’s expand R&D in China to tap the vast pool 
of talents and ideas and to stay abreast of compe-
titors in the increasingly sophisticated markets 
of China and Asia. The supply of talented man-
power exceeds foreign firms demand, universities 
and research institutes are eager to get funding 
from private firms, the high-technology parks, 
the governmental incentives and the potential 
to reduce costs across all the stages of the R&D 
value chain, tend to shift TNCs R&D labs from 
support and adaptation to full-scale R&D work 
using China’s emerging technologies and talent 
pools19. The turn of the millennium was confir-
med in the second half of the decade, as the pace 
of R&D investment growth in China was 20 % a 
17. WIR 2005
18. WIR 2005, overview, p.XXVI-XXXII.
19. WIR 2005, p.166.
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year, on average, between 2000 and 2010, versus 
3.2 % on average, in G 7 markets. Raising the 
R&D intensity in the next decade to 2.5 % of 
GDP, which is a realistic aim of the 2020 Plan, 
would translate into tripling R&D spending to 
300 billion $US. 
The top 25 TNC’s by reported R&D investment, 
collectively responsible for nearly 84 billion $US 
R&D investment in 2010, have a tendency to 
globalize their activities in research intensive 
industries such as pharmaceuticals and techno-
logy hardware. Pfizer, the world’s second-leading 
corporate R&D investor (at 7.4 billion $US), has 
its own R&D center in Shanghai and research 
partnerships with leading Chinese universities. 
General Electric has had research facilities since 
2000. Ten years later, 1,500 of its global 2,800 
research staff are based in China. Philips has 
1,800 research and development staff in China, 
110 of them working on high-level research. 
Microsoft employs 3,750 full-time researchers 
and developers in China, over 300 coming from 
the US and Europe, and 7,000 outside the com-
pany, working on a contract basis. Ninety percent 
of its R&D activity is for global products, with 
only 5 to 10 percent for local products. Intel, 
which had established its China Research center 
in 1998, has announced new equity investments 
in clean technology and healthcare software in 
China. IBM launched the China Analytics Solu-
tions Center in 2009, to support its expansion 
in the region, and Applied Materials opened 
the world’s largest solar research center in Xian, 
China, in 2009. This tendency may accelerate in 
the next decade, as students of Chinese origin 
now receive 11 % of all US scientific and engi-
neering doctoral degrees, with more than 4000 
PhD’s in 2007, twice as many as students from 
Indian origin, and as global R&D investment is 
shifting toward growth markets20.
Returning members of the Chinese diaspora play 
a key role in these R&D centers where locally 
recruited researchers provide the main man-
power. In Shanghai, over 353 TNC R&D cen-
ters were established by 201021. Between 2004 
20. Douglas Gilman, Th e new geography of global innova-
tion , Global Markets Institute, September 20, 2010, Gold-
man Sachs; Andrew Moody, “Research in motion : Multina-
tionals moving R&D centers to China as the country aims 
to become an innovation nation”, China Daily, European 
Weekly, November 11-17, 2011, p.1, 5-6.
21. WIR 2005, p.185, p.142. China Daily, European Weekly, 
November 11-17, 2011, p.1.
and 2010, R&D related FDI stock raised from 
4 billion $US to 12.8 billion $US, according 
to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. R&D 
centers established by foreign affiliates, gene-
rally wholly owned by their parent company, are 
mainly focusing on adaptive innovations for the 
Chinese market, especially in the electronic and 
ICT industries, with Beijing and Shanghai as the 
main centers. But this stage can evolve into global 
innovative R&D in certain cases: since the 1990s 
China mobile telecommunications has become 
the world’s largest, in terms of network capacity 
as well as number of subscribers. Many telecom 
equipment makers have invested in production 
facilities as well as in R&D. Motorola had set its 
first R&D center in 1990, it had 15 centers with 1 
300 R&D employees in 2004. Nokia at the same 
date had five centers with 800 R&D personnel 
while Ericsson had 9 centers with 700 R&D per-
sonnel. Certain models of mobile phones for the 
Asia Pacific market or the world market, inclu-
ding for 3G technologies, have been developed 
both for the Chinese market and the world mar-
ket, in the R&D centers of Nokia or Ericsson. 
Although labor rates in engineering were about 
a fifth of those in the US or Europe, before the 
global crisis of 2008, they reached about 40 % in 
2011, and might eventually become similar with 
the quick rise of the costs of living in Shanghai 
or Beijing, where most of the R&D centers are 
based. In this new environment, the balance 
between cost and performance of products and 
processes, what Eric Thun calls “frugal enginee-
ring”, and the choice of the best Chinese sup-
pliers in terms of costs and quality will certainly 
raise the local R&D competition, and adapt it to 
the constraints of emerging markets22.
The 2020 Plan for S&T and the key 
role of state owned enterprises
The current policy has been established during 
the last science conference, which took place in 
2005, and issued a Medium and Long Term Plan 
for S&T for the period 2006-2020, with the fol-
lowing objectives: increasing R&D intensity to 
2% of GDP in 2010 and to 2.5% in 2020; S&T 
contribution to 60% of growth; dependence on 
foreign technology reduced to 30%; and position 
22. Eric Th un, Said Business School, Oxford University, 
“Shaping the new economy: R&D centers in China provide 
an opportunity for companies to re-think design, innova-
tion”, China Daily European Weekly, Nov-11-17, 2011, p.7.
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China as number 5 for patents and citations of 
publications worldwide. 
To reach these objectives, the country must give 
priority to technological development in 11 key 
sectors (energy, water resources, environmental 
protection, ICT, nanosciences and nanotechno-
logy, health, food agriculture and fisheries, bio-
technology, aeronautics, aerospace, new mate-
rials, security and defense), as well as improve 
the national Intellectual Property System and its 
enforcement, and encourage enterprises to play 
the key role in innovation through state projects, 
tax incentives and other financial support23. Six-
teen mega projects were already carried out during 
the 11th 5-year plan (2006-2010) on key sectors. 
In the 12th 5-year plan (2011-2015), the empha-
sis is augmented on life sciences, and in particu-
lar drug discovery, and infectious diseases, which 
have strong societal and economical potential, 
and where China needs upgrade. 
In addition to S&T programs which play a signa-
ling role to enterprises in terms of priority direc-
tions, in S&T intensive sectors such as IT, new 
materials, new energy, biotech and environmental 
technology, the government favors S&T Indus-
trial Parks (STIP) and Technology Business 
Incubators (TBI) to promote academia-industry 
partnerships, through both commercialization 
and internationalization of R&D24. Zhongguan-
cun Science Park, in the Northwest of Beijing 
Haidian district, is the largest science park, home 
to 40 universities and 130 research institutes. By 
2004, it had attracted 41 foreign invested R&D 
centers, 60 % of them in the ICT industry, by 
leading TNC’s such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM, 
Motorola, Nokia, Nortel, Oracle, Samsung, Sie-
mens, Sony, Sun Microsystems and Toshiba, to 
name a few. 
This 2020 Plan represents a radical change from 
the previous policy as it aims to decrease the 
country’s reliance on foreign technology to 30 
% or below, and to develop «  indigenous inno-
vation  ». The technology development is now 
based on an «  import-assimilate and re-inno-
vate » model. This is a far cry from the previous 
23. National Guidelines for the Medium and Long-term Plan 
for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)
24. In 2006, STIPs accounted 45 828 companies, with 5.7 
million employment, mainly shareholding (23 244) with 
2.7 million employees, but also collectively owned, State-
Owned or foreign owned enterprises: see Martin Schaaper, 
(2009), p. 31.
division of labor as noticed by the Executive 
Vice-President of IBM for innovation and tech-
nology, Nicholas M. Donofrio, who declared in 
2005:  «  the global innovation-commoditization 
cycle has never been more pronounced than it 
is today, and it forces distinct choices. Winners 
can be the innovators –those with the capacity 
to invest, manage and leverage the creation of 
intellectual capital- or the commodity players, 
who differentiate through low prices, economies 
of scale and efficient distribution of other parties’ 
intellectual capital  »25. The previous low-skilled 
and low-paid worker thus reincarnates into an 
engineer, who re-innovates through the re-appro-
priation of intellectual capital. A clear illustration 
of the process of climbing up the value chain.
A striking feature of China’s innovation system is 
the expanded role of enterprises, and its orienta-
tion toward development activities. Government 
research institutes, which are supposed to carry 
on basic as well as applied research, represent 
less than 20 % of R&D expenditure, and 18 % of 
R&D personnel (2006). In 2005, nearly 95 % of 
their expenditure was concentrated in the field of 
natural sciences and high-tech related fields. The 
higher education sector, where applied research 
is predominant, concentrates less than 10 % of 
R&D expenditures, and 16 % of R&D personnel, 
mainly based in the top 50 universities (66 % of 
expenditures) on a few key disciplines in natu-
ral sciences and engineering. The business sector 
provides a large share of its funding, and plays an 
important role in research-industry linkage. 
The bulk of R&D, 71 %, is almost self-financed 
by the business sector, mainly the State-owned 
and State holding enterprises which occupy 
nearly 66 % of R&D personnel on experimental 
development in diverse industrial sectors (com-
munication, computer, electronic equipment, ins-
truments, chemicals etc.). As in the higher edu-
cation sector, R&D activities are often carried out 
on a project basis. The share of basic and applied 
research expenditures over total R&D spending 
went down to 17 % in 2010, compared to the 
OECD countries with an average level of 50 %. 
Basic research represents less than 6 % of total 
R&D spending, with a slight decline in recent 
years, to be compared with an average of 20 % 
in OECD countries. The present step by step 
catching up strategy is clearly focused on deve-
lopment (83 % of R&D) in order to reduce the 
25. Fabre, G., (2008), p. 305.
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technological dependency to OECD countries 
and to compete with them on innovative pro-
ducts. The new technology intensive growth aims 
at a higher economic efficiency, by lower energy 
consumption, lesser pollution and a better use of 
human resources. In order to bridge the techno-
logy gap with OECD countries, State-owned 
enterprises, the country’s 80 to 100 big corpo-
rations were chosen as the foundations of the 
country’s micro-economy as well as the key com-
ponents of the indigenous innovation policy. 
As the 2020 Plan aims at indigenous innova-
tion and the reduction of the dependency on 
foreign technology, it is legitimate to ask if the 
internationalization of R&D, as the next stage 
of outsourcing, will turn into a win-win situa-
tion. Large public investment toward important 
areas of research has put China on the map in 
genomics, nanotechnology, clean energy, space 
science, supercomputing and defense technology. 
Apart from these dramatic successes in strategic 
sectors of R&D, China’s relies on the size of its 
potential consumption market, the scale of its 
public investment and procurement, the compe-
titiveness of its labor force and the dynamics of 
its R&D and innovation policy, to ask for tech-
nology transfer in exchange for market access26.
Some oppose strong arguments against such 
deals. As high-tech sectors, like alternative 
energy are supposed to revive economic growth 
in OECD countries, Gary P. Pisano, from the 
Harvard Business School, underlines the fact that 
the US « has lost or is in the process of losing 
the ability to manufacture many of the cutting-
edge products it invented. These include the bat-
teries that power electric and hybrid cars, light-
emitting diodes (LEDs) for the next generation 
of energy-efficient lighting, critical components 
of solar panels, advanced displays for mobile 
phones and new consumer electronics products 
like Amazon’s Kindle e-reader, and many of the 
carbon-fiber components for Boeing’s new 787 
Dreamliner ». He opposes the idea of divisibility 
of R&D and manufacturing which has prevailed 
in the last 25 years. Innovation needs a two-way 
feedback, from R&D to production but also from 
production to R&D, as «  the act of production 
creates knowledge about the process and the 
product design ». There are of course exceptions 
where R&D and manufacturing are separable, 
but in the vast majority of high-tech products, 
26. Gordon, K., Lyon, S., Paisley, E., Pool, S., (2011).
« when manufacturing capabilities migrate from a 
country, design and R&D capabilities eventually 
follow »27.
In fact, for foreign companies, producing in China 
is the only way to get access to the market. In 2007, 
foreign capital firms were responsible for about 
25 % of total industrial production for domestic 
use (Gaulier, G., Lemoine, F., Deniz Ünal, D., 
2011). But in the same time, as Nirmal Chandra 
underlines, citing the Eleventh Five Year Plan for 
Use of Foreign Investment: China will « encou-
rage foreign enterprises – especially large-scale 
multinationals – to transfer the processing and 
manufacturing processes with higher technology 
levels and higher added-value and research and 
development organizations to China…to develop 
a technology spillover effect, and strengthen the 
independent innovation ability of Chinese enter-
prises…. The overall strategic objective of use of 
foreign investment in China is to … change the 
(previous) emphasis from making up the shortage 
of capital and foreign exchange to introducing 
advanced technology » (Chandra, N. 2012). 
In the new landscape of indigenous innovation, 
quite different from the previous one, the ques-
tion for most foreign capital corporations is less 
to control « the stealing of IPR » by counterfeit-
ers, than to organize the extent of their technol-
ogy transfer while keeping their core technology. 
There is no way to capture the real dimensions 
of these transfers, since the Chinese government 
does not publish any balance of payments for 
technology. Some studies conclude that as the 
skill intensity of exports increases, the percent-
age of the value of the final product that derives 
from imported components rises sharply, as for 
electronic devices (85.2 %), telecommunication 
equipment (91.6 %) and computers (96.1 %). 
China would have remained « a low value-added 
assembler of more sophisticated inputs imported 
from abroad, a ‘workbench’ economy  » (Moran, 
T.H. 2011). The dominance of foreign firms and 
the large share of imported materials in process-
ing trade «  raise the question whether China’s 
high-tech industries are really high-tech and 
whether the high-tech industries in China are 
really Chinese » (Schaaper, M., 2009, p.62). These 
27. Gary M. Pisano, « The U.S. is Outsourcing Away Its 
Competitive Edge », Harvard Business Review, October 1, 
2009. http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/hbr/restoring-ame-
rican-competitiveness/ 2009/10/the-us-is-outsourcing-
away-its.html
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conclusions may be excessive, as noted by Nirmal 
Chandra. Since the threshold of foreign equity 
is only 10 %, many foreign enterprises may be 
controlled by State-owned enterprises, and these 
figures do not reveal the potential of China’s 
domestic firms, as China has become the regional 
hub for the production of high-tech goods. After 
all, Korea’s Samsung and LG began assembling 
electronic components as subcontractors of US 
majors, before rising to the status of global lead-
ers (Chandra, N., 2012).
According to the first national survey of firm 
innovation conducted by the State Statistical 
Bureau in 2007, State-owned and state-holding 
enterprises are the main actors of innovation in 
China, since they account for 81 % of total busi-
ness R&D in 2006, mainly in pharmaceuticals, 
instrument and office machines, tobacco, com-
munication and electronic equipment, and spe-
cial measuring equipment28. SOE’s have been the 
core of China’s « going global strategy » since its 
launching in 2000, and they play a dominant role, 
after their restructuration in the 1990s in capital 
intensive and strategic sectors such as petroleum, 
coking, nuclear fuel, raw chemical material, trans-
port equipment, mining and electric and heat 
power, gas and water. Their profits have increased 
nearly four-fold between 2000 and 2009 and in 
2007, they represented 83 % of the stock market 
capitalization29. 
Catching-up in high 
potential sectors
High speed trains
The high-speed (HS) railway program is a very 
interesting example of China’s indigenous inno-
vation policy led by SOE’s. The first HS rail-
way, the Beijing-Tianjin intercity line, covering 
the 120 km distance in 30 minutes, was opened 
for service on August 1, 2008. With the global 
financial crisis of 2008, China’s leaders turned the 
project into a part of the economic stimulus pack-
age, speeding construction, including moving up 
the completion of the 33 billion $US Beijing-
Shanghai line in a year. By the end of 2009, total 
HS operating length had reached 6,552 km, and 
28. Schaaper, M. (2009), p.56  ; Wu YanRui, (2010) and 
(2011), p.7-8.
29. Lee, J., (2009); The Economist, 3/09/2011.
the Ministry of Railway had another additional 
10,000 km of HS rails under construction 30.
The People’s Daily presented the development 
of China’s high-speed railways as an example of 
domestic innovation after incorporating advanced 
technology from developed nations31. In 2004 the 
Railway Ministry signed deals to buy trains from 
Kawasaki Heavy Industry (KHI), which trans-
ferred production facilities and the know-how 
for its 200 km/h bullet train for 760 million $US. 
Alstom and Bombardier signed similar deals 
for their first or second generation bullet trains 
rolling at 200-250 km/h, and in 2005, Siemens 
transferred technologies for a 300 km/h HS train. 
Engineers trained by Kawasaki in Japan later 
helped to build the Qingdao factory of China’s 
South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry 
Corp. or CSR, which now produces about 200 
train sets a year, some of them rolling at 300 
km/h. A CSR senior engineer declared: «  Real 
innovation is rare. We attained our achievements 
in high-speed train technology by standing on 
the shoulders of past pioneers »32. 
While its competitors from Bombardier, Siemens 
and Alstom preferred to keep silent, in a market 
which is expected to account for more than half of 
global railway spending, until 2020, according to 
World Bank estimates, Kawasaki openly denied 
China’s claim that it had created its own technol-
ogy. According to a public communiqué of the 
firm, the CRH2 bullet train in operation today is 
practically the same as the original Japanese one. 
KHI hopes to settle the issue through commercial 
talks, but contests the IPR of its Chinese partner 
to export the technology33. The Chinese Ministry 
of Railways has organized a team of lawyers to 
examine how vulnerable state companies would 
be to IP lawsuits, in outside markets. But some 
foreign companies have already accepted to form 
partnerships with the Chinese groups bidding 
on HS projects all over the world. In 2010 for 
instance, Siemens dropped its own bid to build 
and operate a line in Saudi Arabia so it could join 
a Chinese consortium. 
If competitors mostly believe that China has in 
a way « metabolized » the imported technology, 
the Chinese however have been mastering the 
30. Xinhua, 3/07/2010.
31. Li Hujun, Caixing, 23/06/2011.
32. Norihiko Shorozu, Wall Street Journal, 22/11/2010.
33. Norihiko Shirozu, Wall Street Journal, 22/11/2010.
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competition between different foreign groups in 
order to obtain a larger share of technology than 
it was publicly admitted. Foreign industry execu-
tives estimate than around 90 % of the HS tech-
nology used in China derives from partnerships 
or equipment developed by foreign companies, 
while for such programs the Chinese government 
applies the rule of a 30 % dependency, which 
means officially that 70 % of the (digested) tech-
nology is Chinese.34
Although tarnished by the dismissal and arrest for 
corruption of the Chinese Ministry of Railway, 
Liu Zhijun, in February 2011, and later by the 
tragic collusion of two trains in Wenzhou which 
caused 40 deaths and hundreds of casualties ( July 
2011), the Chinese HS train program, with all 
the excesses of a «  top-down  » strategy, illus-
trates the huge amount of investments in « indig-
enous innovation », which has been allocated by 
the stimulus package following the global crisis 
of 2008. The rhythm of the indigenous innova-
tion policy has clearly accelerated since 2008, 
reflecting the evolution of the leadership’s choices 
in favor of strategic sectors such as aircraft and 
spacecraft (where R&D represents 15.39 % of 
the added value), electronic and communications 
equipment (where its share is 6.78 %), medical 
equipment and meters manufacturing (6.28 %), 
pharmaceuticals (4.66 %), computers and offices 
equipment (3.87 %).35
Aeronautics
If we turn to the aircraft and Aerospace industry, 
which is the top priority of China’s innovation 
policy, it is striking to observe the asymmetry 
between the Chinese government’s strategic will 
and the relative passivity of the US and European 
governments which tend to relegate policy deve-
lopments in this area to private parties, or even 
to follow their initiatives. In May 2008, China 
announced that it had “ established a homegrown 
company to make passenger jumbo jets… to 
become less dependent on Boeing and Airbus”. 
A new consortium is formed, the China Com-
mercial Aircraft Company, with a capitalization 
of 2.72 billions $US, and the participation of the 
two leading aircraft companies in China, China 
Aviation Industry Corporation I, (AVIC I), and 
China Aviation Industry Corporation II, (AVIC 
II), which have about 491,000 employees with 
34. Jamil Anderlini, Financial Times, 23/10/2010.
35. Wu, Yan Rui, (2011).
their subsidiaries. China already has the muscles 
for such an ambition with six companies devoted 
to « air frame assembly », eight « engine compa-
nies », 28 entities involved with components, and 
20 research institutes36. 
The same year, China signs an agreement with 
Airbus to build a plant in Tianjin, which is now 
assembling with success 10 % of the A 320 
production. The European aircraft manufactu-
rer has planed to deliver more than 110 A 320 
planes to China in 2011, accounting for one fifth 
of the company’s deliveries worldwide, and has 
sold to China Southern Airline his first out of 
five superjumbo A 380 aircraft. Airbus remains 
optimistic about the perspectives of the Chinese 
market, since it is the second in the world and 
should be the first at the 2020 horizon, according 
to its projections37. In the interval, in April 2009, 
a first design of the planned Chinese Jumbo jet, 
the new « C 919 » was released, with the first test 
flight announced for 2014 and the first delivery 
for 2016. The country would be capable to pro-
duce 150 domestically made jumbo planes each 
year. « Although Western companies are seeking 
to become suppliers to the program, even if they 
are successful, question remains regarding how 
much of those contracts will be supported by pro-
duction outside China » asked an aircraft expert38. 
Two agreements recently signed provide an 
answer, and suggest that the same digestive pro-
portion as for the HS trains, 70 % of «  indige-
nous innovation » and 30 % of foreign technology 
dependence, will apply in the aircraft industry. In 
September 2011, AVIC, the supplier of the C 
919 project, signed a 50/50 joint venture with 
General Electric, to develop a new generation of 
its avionic operating system (the « brains » gui-
ding navigation, communication, and other ope-
rations on an airplane), which is already on board 
the Boeing 78739. The same month the French 
government created, after «  Centrale Beijing  », 
one of his best engineering university, and the 
«Sino-French Institute of nuclear energy  », the 
36.  USCC.gov, U.S-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, May 10, 2010, Testimony of Owen E.Herrnst 
Adt, Director of Trade and Globalisation, International As-
sociation of Machinist and Aerospace Workers, «  China’s 
Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation 
Capabilities », hereafter: Owen E.Herrnst Adt.
37. Xinhua, 15/10/2011.
38. Owen E. Herrnst Adt, Testimony, op.cit.
39. John Bussey, China Venture is good for GE but is it good 
for the U.S? The Wall Street Journal, 30/09/2011.
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«  Sino-European Institute of Aviation Engi-
neering » in Tianjin, a consortium of the Ecole 
Nationale de l’Aviation Civile (ENAC), the Ins-
titut Superieur de l’Aéronautique et de l’Espace 
(ISAE) and of the Ecole Nationale Supérieure 
d’Aéronautique et d’Aérotechnique (ENSMA), 
which will form a first promotion of 100 engi-
neers in 2013. French officials tend to insist on 
the francophone curriculum40, while the Chinese 
authorities are more motivated by other perspec-
tives. The C 919, if successful, would be the first 
of the new models of the Chinese aircraft indus-
try, which may compete with Boeing and Airbus 
in the market for large commercial aircrafts. Here 
again, the two companies believe that their tech-
nological advance and manufacturing capacities 
may keep them ahead of innovation. 
Clean energy
The two examples of the HS train program and 
the C 919 project are clear illustrations of the 
Chinese art of creating competition between 
TNC’s while restricting their share of big pub-
lic procurement contracts through indigenous 
innovation as well as by organizing bidding pro-
cesses in favor of Chinese SOE’s. Clean energy 
is another priority of the 2020 Plan, not only for 
obvious domestic reasons, (China being the larg-
est issuer of CO2) but also because by 2020, it will 
be one of the world’s biggest industries, estimated 
at 2.3 trillion $US41. China is the first country in 
the world in terms of renewable electricity capac-
ity, with 16 % of its electricity from hydropower 
and wind power at the end of 2009. The wind 
power sector has been growing rapidly through 
the Kyoto Protocol clean development mecha-
nism (CDM), which allowed advanced countries 
to offset their emissions at home by investing in 
clean energy projects and transferring technology 
in developing countries such as China. A surge of 
investment followed in the very attractive domes-
tic market, to the extent that major wind manu-
facturers rapidly grew from a mere five or six to 
70 in 2008, leading the Chinese government to 
revise its 2007 national target of respectively 10 
GW and 30 GW of installed wind capacity for 
2010 and 2020, as 20 GW were already installed 
at the end of 2009! But here again, the authori-
ties imposed a 70 % local requirement for wind 
power equipment, all along this surge, according 
40. Les Echos, 27/09/2011.
41. Gordon, K., Wong, J.L., McLain, J.T., (2010) p.1. 
to the standard of « indigenous innovation ». The 
result was that the share of foreign suppliers in 
this fast growing market dropped from 75 % in 
2004 to 13,8 % in 2009. This requirement has 
finally been dropped following the complaints of 
foreign manufacturers at the beginning of 2010, 
but it has served its purpose, since there are now 
concerns for wind manufacturing overcapacities 
among Chinese wind firms and a race for exports. 
Today, only domestic or JV firms with at least 
50 % Chinese ownership can operate or develop 
offshore wind farms. The American Chamber of 
Commerce and the European Chamber of Com-
merce in China have openly complained since 
2010 about these forests of moving rules, which 
have the purpose to restrict access to the local 
market, in a lot of sectors42. 
As for solar energy, China has been the leading 
manufacturer of photovoltaic panels, behind Ger-
many, with 30 % of the world production mainly 
for exports. At the end of 2009, the country had 
just 0.3 megawatts of installed power capacity, 
but two major policies were adopted in the same 
year to stimulate the domestic market, and in July 
2011, the release of a national photovoltaic feed-
in-tariff policy has resulted in a surge of non-
residential projects. In 2011, the PV market in 
China will exceed 1.6 GW, a 230 % growth over 
2010 43. Applied Materials, one of the world’s lea-
ding suppliers of the equipment to make semi-
conductors, solar-panels and flat–panel displays 
has based in Xi’an, northern China, the only 
research center that can fit an entire solar panel 
assembly line, to make advanced research on solar 
manufacturing. The choice of Xi’an is motivated 
by an attractive discount on a 75 year land-lease, 
five-years subsidies covering a quarter of the lab’s 
operating costs, and the supply of low-cost engi-
neers with master’s degree who can be hired for 
730 $US per month. The development phase of 
the global research will be done in Xi’an, with 
360 employee-operation, while the company has 
resolved to reduce employment from 10 to 12 %, 
42. Gordon, K. (2011) p.29-30; Mc Gregor, J. (2011) p.33; 
James T. Areddy, U.S. firms complain of China’s heavy hand, 
The Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2011. European Chamber 
of Commerce (2010), European Business in China, Position 
Paper, 2010-2011, p.353-354.  http://www.europeancham-
ber.com.cn/view/static/?sid=7479
43. Gordon, K. (2011). p.28-29 ; http://www.solarbuzz.com, 
October 10, 2011 : China’s feed-in tariff policy stimulates 14 
GW photovoltaic project pipeline .
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or 1300 to 1500 jobs, in the US and Europe44. 
This recent example shows how the internatio-
nalization of R&D may stimulate a country’s 
competition.
Information technology
The strong focus in Western media on the cen-
sorship imposed on the Internet has often led 
to underestimate the strategy of China towards 
IT and the information society, and overestimate 
the importance of the control of the content. 
The reality is rather different. John Chambers, 
the CEO of Cisco Systems, a front ranking IT 
firm making network technologies, was repor-
ted saying as early as 2003: « China will become 
the IT center of the world. What we’re trying to 
do is to outline an entire strategy of becoming a 
Chinese company »45. 
IT is a global worldwide priority, for which 
China enjoys a predominant position. China has 
the largest connected population: half a billion 
people on line, and close to a billion with mobile 
phones, with a strong appetence for new tech-
nologies. Some of its corporations in IT are now 
among the very first ones in the world: telecom 
operators as well as equipment corporations, and 
its research is becoming visible. 
IT is the top priority of most of the Chinese 
research programs, with for instance more than 
20% of the spending of the 863 program for 
high-tech R&D in 2008, and three out of the 16 
priorities of the 2020 Plan. As a result, the num-
ber of publications in information technology has 
increased drastically in recent years. « In 2009, for 
the first time, Chinese researchers published more 
papers in information technology than those in 
the US, with both countries churning out more 
than 100,000 info-tech publications  »46 accor-
ding to a survey of SciVal Analytics, a division of 
Elsevier for Forbes. With a growth of 22% since 
2005, China has tripled its number of articles. 
The impact of the Chinese publications still lags 
behind at 0.6 of the world average, versus 1.6 for 
the US, but it has been continuously increasing. 
In some fields its achievements have gained great 
pride. 
44. Keith Bradsher, China drawing high-tech research from 
US, The New York Times, 17/03/2010. 
45. Chandra, N. (2012)
46 . h t t p : / /www. f o r b e s . c om/ s i t e s /ma t t h ewhe r -
per/2011/05/25/the-most-innovative-countries-in-infor-
mation-technology/
China pursues a very aggressive strategy in super-
computing. It hits the headlines in November 
2010, when it became host of the world fastest 
computer, with its supercomputer Tianhe-1A, 
made by the National University of Defense for 
the National Super Computing Center in Tianjin. 
Tianhe-1A reached 2566 Tflops (trillions opera-
tions per seconds), twice as much as the fastest 
American supercomputer, the Cray at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, which reached 1759 
Tflops47. The third supercomputer in the Top500 
list of supercomputers, the Nebulae, also Chinese, 
was made by Dawning, for the National Super-
computing Center in Shenzhen. 
While back in 2001, China had not a single com-
puter on the Top500 list; it had 61 a decade later, 
and holds now the second position for the super-
computing power, after the US, which have 255 
sites, and ahead of Germany, the UK, Japan and 
France. This boosted the efforts of Japan to come 
back in the race, and take over the first position 
in June 2011.
The chips used in the Chinese supercompu-
ters are Intel CPUs, and graphical chips, Nvidia 
GPUs, thus still American technology, but China 
is working also on new generations of supercom-
puter based on Chinese chips only. The super-
computer Dawning 6000 relies on the Chinese 
chip Godson 3B developed by the Chinese Aca-
demy of Sciences, provides 300 Tflops, and is 
claimed to be more energy efficient. China has 
invested less though in the software issues raised 
by its supercomputers, whose capacity is currently 
under used. 
The Telecom industry is extremely successful, 
with about 900 million mobile users at the end of 
2011, three big operators, all state owned, China 
Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile, and 
a very active sector of telecom equipment corpo-
rations, dominated by Huawei and ZTE. Huawei 
is now the second supplier of mobile telecom 
infrastructures in the world after Erikson. All 
these companies have developed important R&D 
labs. The most impressive is Huawei, which has 
developed a large worldwide network of twenty 
laboratories, with its main campus in Shenzhen, 
and labs in the USA, Russia, India, Sweden, 
France, etc. Huawei, with about half of its work-
force (50,000 employees) devoted to research, 
47. The list of the top 500 supercomputers is published twice 
a year on www.top500.org.
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spent 16 billions Yuan (2.5 billion $US) for R&D 
in 2010, with an annual increase of 24%. Some 
products raised controversies, first on IPR issues, 
for instance with Cisco on technologies for router 
and switches, as well as more generally on secu-
rity issues. 
The Chinese Internet is the largest in the world 
with half a billion people online. The Chinese 
language is also the second language with 509 
million Chinese-speaking people online in 2010, 
almost as many as the 565 million online English 
speakers48, but with a smaller penetration rate, 
37% versus 43%, which will undoubtedly lead the 
Chinese to become the first linguistic community 
online. 
China has developed a large industry on the net, 
with essentially all the usual services offered by 
mostly American companies, such as online 
search engines, social networks, news, business, 
instant messaging, etc. Chinese companies have 
taken advantage in their development of the 
difficulties to access their foreign counterparts 
from Mainland China. Among the top 20 sites 
in the world, published by Alexa49, a subsidiary of 
Amazon, China counts 4 sites, while the others 
all belong to US corporations. It is worth men-
tioning them: Baidu, the Chinese search engine, 
also operating in Japan; QQ, owned by Tencent, 
which offers mail, instant messaging, games, etc.; 
Taobao, an e-commerce platform; and finally 
Sina, which provides news as well as other ser-
vices. All of them are widely used in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan of course, but also in South Korea, 
as well as in Russia for e-commerce on Taobao. 
It is worth noting that China is the only country 
that succeeded in developing such a powerful 
industry not relying on the services offered by US 
corporations. 
The telecom equipment industry is also of stra-
tegic interest, not only for its important business 
perspectives, but also for security reasons. Huawei 
is an excellent illustration of the potential of 
Chinese SOEs, which managed to challenge 
well established enterprises on the global market, 
such as Alcatel-Lucent for instance, and compete 
with them on research issues. China has deve-
loped a very comprehensive and strategic vision 
for the telecoms, from the equipment industry 
and the operators to the content industries. This 
48. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm
49. http://www.alexa.com/topsites
has raised some worries in the US, which have 
a strong domination of the Internet, essentially 
only challenged by China. 
CONCLUSION 
Until recently, China’s R&D and innovation 
policy has been mainly analyzed in comparison 
with that of Japan and the four dragons, in terms 
of “climbing up the value chain”. This type of 
analysis underestimates the impact of the scale of 
China, with not only the new “scientific and engi-
neering demography” created by the “Real leap 
forward” of the 2000s but also the manufacturing 
capacity which has already bypassed that of the 
U.S, the growing internal market, and the rising 
presence of Chinese TNC’s in emerging markets.
If we add to these factors national sovereignty, 
which plays a key role in the sensitive IT sector, 
as well as in defense related R&D, it is clear that 
China’s R&D and innovation strategy, presen-
ted in 2006 as the second stage of the opening 
and reform policy, is slowly changing the global 
landscape of technology, and moving the fron-
tiers. Although China’s wish to reduce its tech-
nology dependency is perfectly legitimate, the 
“indigenous innovation” set in the 2020 Plan is 
viewed by many international technology com-
panies as a “blueprint for technology theft on a 
scale the world has never seen before”… Some 
analysts remain pessimistic as regards the conse-
quences of this new “techno-nationalism” cou-
pled with a reduction of market access: “As the 
belief by foreign companies that large financial 
investments, the sharing of expertise and signi-
ficant technology transfers would lead to an 
ever opening China market is being replaced 
by boardroom banter that win-win in China 
means China wins twice”, we are heading toward 
“contentious trade disputes and inflamed political 
rhetoric on both sides”50.
“Innovation with Chinese characteristics” stran-
gely recalls the banner of “Marxism with Chinese 
characteristics”, which opened the way to the 
subsequent Maoist’s drifts51. But today’s stakes, 
by shifting to science, at a time when China has 
become the leading manufacturing country in 
the world, and may become a leading country in 
strategic sectors such as IT, are of another scale. 
It remains to be seen if this “top-down” model 
50. Mac Gregor, J. (2011), p.4 and 6.
51. Fabre, G., (1990), p. 49-50.
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of R&D and innovation, strongly criticized by 
prominent Chinese scientists, from inside and 
outside China, for giving bureaucrats too much 
power on scientists52, does not aim at using R&D 
for the sole benefit of a political power. The derail-
ment of the HS train program, following a fatal 
HS train crash in July 2011 illustrates the limits 
of this new “techno-nationalism”. 
However, it would be a mistake to focus on 
“indigenous innovation” without considering 
the whole picture of the R&D landscape, which 
is much more open that it seems at first sight. 
Although there are conflicting views in some 
strategic sectors, such as aeronautics, clean energy 
vehicles, HS trains, where “the Chinese govern-
ment exerts leverage where it can and foreign 
firms do what they can to limit the loss of their 
core technologies”, R&D is not reducible to this 
“cat and mouse game”53. In other sectors such as 
chemistry, life sciences, IT, and nanotechnology, 
things appear much more open, and the constant 
flow of foreign researchers, now facilitated with 
the Chinese green card, or researchers of Chinese 
origin from the U.S and Europe, to China and 
back, may certainly create a new climate of hybrid 
R&D and innovation, such as the one which 
already exists with other East Asian countries. 
Some TNC’s executives are convinced that 
China is the new frontier of innovation. Andrew 
Lewis, the CEO of Dow chemicals is confident 
that “innovation has followed manufacturing to 
China”… “Over time, when companies decide 
where to build R&D facilities, it will make more 
and more sense to do things like product sup-
port, upgrades and next generation design in the 
same place where the product is made”…” “That 
is one reason why Dow has 500 Chinese scien-
tists working in China, earning incredibly good 
money, and who are already generating more 
patent per scientist than our other locations”54. 
The Chinese president’s speech at the APEC 
summit in Hawaii illustrates the strong political 
will of the leadership in this regard: “China will 
work hard to turn itself into an innovation driven 
country, bring in high caliber and innovation-
minded professionals from overseas and realize 
the transformation of Made in China to Created 
52. Nature Magazine, special issue, Fall 2004.
53. Eric Th un, op. cit. p.7.
54. John Bussey, Does history says China wins? Wall Street 
Journal, November 4, 2011.
by China”55. But it is still unclear whether these 
two approaches are compatible on the long term. 
It will depend not only on the pragmatism of 
the Chinese direction but also on the capacity of 
non-Chinese to adapt to China, to its culture, to 
its rules, and interact in a constructive way with 
a new and considerable actor, which is definitely 
changing the R&D landscape. 
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